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, that "a subtile substance of a quickly and powerfully mobile nature, seems to pervade every thing, and appears to be the life of the world; and therefore it is probable that a similar substance pervades organized bodies, and produces similar effects in them" (51). In March 1816, Lawrence responded with An Introduction to Comparative Anatomy and Physiology, denying the presence of a supervenient vital fluid and insisting that life was simply a matter of organization, or "the assemblage of all the functions" (120). Unlike more strictly mechanistic models of human physiologywhich saw life as "an assemblage of pipes, canals, levers, pulleys, and other mechanism," as Lawrence put it (speaking of the school of Hermann Boerhaave)-Lawrence's brand of materialism drew a distinction between life as an assemblage of functions and life as an assemblage of parts (Lectures 67). According to Lawrence, the latter would be the study of anatomy, rather than physiology, since it could not account for certain vital phenomena present only in living bodies. Unlike his more radical French counterparts, Lawrence recognized that after the midcentury discovery of sensibility and irritability by Albrecht von Haller, it was no longer possible to embrace uncritically a mechanistic Newtonian physiology. His definition of life as an "assemblage of all the functions" was thus a materialist, not a mechanistic, theory of life. The distinction is significant, for the new vitalist monstrosity that sprang forth against it would not have been possible in the mechanistic world of Newton.
In a series of papers published throughout the 1770s, Hunter defined the methods and techniques of modern physiology, grounding them on the central assumption that "[w]hatever Life is, it most certainly does not depend upon the structure or organization" (Essays 114). Instead, Hunter believed that life was the result of a supervenient, and moreover formative, power. As Abernethy put it, "Hunter was the first who deduced the opinion, as a legitimate consequence of legitimate facts, that life actually constructed the very means by which it carried on its various processes" (Hunterian Oration 42). This Hunterian notion of a self-propagating vital power, which could assert itself beyond the physical border of the organism, effectively enabled the transformation of an Enlightenment concept of monstrosity as an ill assemblage of parts into a vitalist concept of monstrosity as an extension of the living principle.
Hunter's study of monsters in the three divisions of mineral, vegetable, and animal matter contains the logic for understanding this swerve from an established notion of monstrosity as defect or deformity to a Romantic view of monstrosity as a troubling overflow of the living principle. Hunter's observations on monsters (Essays 239-51), published with his posthumous papers in 1861, set out from the prior understanding of monstrosity as malformation: "Nature being pretty constant in the kind and number of the different parts peculiar to each species of animal, and also in the situation, formation, and construction of such parts, we call everything that deviates To illustrate, Hunter considers first monsters of the mineral category. In the case of a crystal, he argues, a defect occurring immediately before or after formation begins can cause the mineral to propagate itself incorrectly. Having set off on the wrong foot, that is, the mineral continues on the road of monstrous generation through a repetition of its aberrational self-production, "the first setting out being wrong, and [the formation] going on in the same [wrong line]." One can see how Hunter's principle of monstrosity is well served when mineral formation, whereby the crystal turns itself into a monster by producing more of itself, is applied to vegetable and animal life, whose self-production is more heterogeneous. Indeed, he proposes that vegetables also consist "only of two parts, the old and the new; the one only a repetition of the other." Vegetable monsters result no longer from a botched arrangement of parts but from an unrestrained and misdirected power of increase. The vegetable need merely extend itself by repetition to qualify as a monster, for by this process "the vegetable works up itself." The Hunterian vegetable is a frothing, uncontainable self-construct, forever in danger of producing new monsters. In fact, vegetables contain the greatest number of monstrosities "because a vegetable can, and is always producing new parts." Thus, "[i]f a natural branch decays, or is destroyed, two or three shall arise in its place, all of which are so many monsters" (241-43). In place of the one decayed part, the vegetable threatens a monstrous multiplicity, becoming the parent stock of "so many monsters." The fear is not that the missing part will reproduce itself but that it will reproduce itself to excess, that the living principle in the plant will take advantage of the momentary gap in its substance and break through with a formative vengeance.
If vegetables, like crystals, consist of only two parts-the old and the new, the former repeating itself into the latter-animals are indisputably organized beings. Yet, just as a missing branch opens the possibility of any number of shapes to its own purposes. In "The Critique of Aesthetic Judgement," Kant claims, "An object is monstrous where by its size it defeats the end that forms its concept" (1: 100). As mentioned above, Blumenbach's notion of a formative force presupposes that all organisms tend toward a form, which characterizes them as members of species. Similarly, in Kant's aesthetic ontology, things in nature exhibit purposiveness; they orient themselves toward a telos that defines them as organized beings.8 Like Hunter's formative force, pushing out as "so many monsters" through momentary gaps in the organism, the aesthetic magnitude that nullifies its own purpose extends outward to Tables  Turned," and as the elder poet's metaphor of vivisection indicates, it is not Newton's analytic procedures but their application to life that is cause for concern in this period. Keats observes of Lamia that "there is that sort of fire in it which must take hold of people in some way-give them either pleasant or unpleasant sensation" ("To George and Georgiana Keats," 27 Sept. The opinion of late years entertained concerning the Cause of nervous energy was started by Mr J.
Hunter. He examined y Body of a Gymnotus
Electricus he found it provided with abundance of Nerves sufficient to account for its electric properties. From this he inferred that the Nerves were conductor of electric fluid. Cavallo Galvani found that a<n> action of y Nerves was produced by applying Metal thereto. The present opinion therefore is that a fluid, like that of the electric is secreted in y brain which is thence communicated along the Nerves.
(Note Book 58)
Attempting to penetrate the mystery of life, Hunter cut into the bowels of the electrically charged eel and discovered its vital powers. In his account of this experiment in the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of 11
May 1775, he remarks that the Gymnotus electricus "may be considered, both anatomically and physiologically, as divided into two parts; viz. the common animal part; and a part which is superadded, viz. the peculiar organ" (395). This "peculiar organ" is the particular object of his study, for it has "peculiar powers" that extend beyond "the common animal part" of the 
